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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the form of the legislative institution - assembly versus parlia-
ment - a¤ects the level and composition of local public expenditure. We use two research designs in
distinct samples of Swiss communes. Our event study analysis focuses on medium-sized and mostly
German-speaking communes that switched from assembly to parliament from 1945 to 2010. The
regression discontinuity analysis is based on small communes from a French-speaking canton over
the period 1986-2005 and exploits a cuto¤ in local population. Event study estimates suggest that
parliament adoption increases total spending by about 6 percent and that this increase is driven
mostly by general administration and education spending. In contrast, regression discontinuity
estimates are too noisy to be informative. To understand the mechanism at play, we run a survey
among assembly participants and document a sizeable under-representation of 20- to 40-year-olds
as well as of women in assemblies compared to both the electorate and to voters. Switching from
assembly democracy to parliament in our setting therefore seems to increase the representation of
two demographics that are known for their relatively strong preferences for education spending.
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1 Introduction
Whether the form of the legislative institution at the local level matters for collective choices is
an open and important question. Citizen assemblies (also called town meetings) are the form
of government in which ordinary citizens gather to legislate and decide budget priorities. Local
parliaments, on the other hand, are characterized by principals (citizens) delegating decision-
making power to their agents (politicians). In order to improve governance, the World Bank and
several aid-organizations have actively promoted citizen participation in local budgeting decisions
for at least two decades (World Bank, 1996), while Bryan (2004) praises the virtues of town
meetings in New England (US). Both legislative forms are prevalent around the world today after
a surge of participatory democracy in several developing countries such as Brazil, Venezuela and
India.
While citizen assemblies seem appealing not least because of their deliberative character,1 what
we ultimately care about is whether they a¤ect policy. Because attending assembly meetings is
time-consuming, theory predicts low and potentially non-representative participation in assembly
democracies (Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner 2000). Voting in elections on the other hand only
requires a trip to the ballot box once every four years or so. Policies may therefore di¤er across
legislative institutions simply because median voters di¤er. Yet to date very little is known about
causal e¤ects of direct democracy compared to a system of representative democracy (see Tyrefors-
Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014, for a notable exception).
This paper provides some of the rst evidence on the e¤ects of legislative form on the level
and composition of public expenditure. The setting is one of a mature democracy (Switzerland),
where representative and assembly democracy coexist at the local level. Our rst analysis focuses
1Deliberation may motivate citizens to participate in town meetings, may a¤ect their information levels, and
also their opinions on specic issues (Ban et al, 2012; Wantchekon et al, 2017).
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on cantons where communes have the authority to determine the form of their legislative power.2
To get information on the communes current and past legislative forms, we sent our own survey
(legislative survey) to all municipalities in these cantons. Based on our survey, canton-level
administrative data and prior surveys on local governance, we identied a switcher sample -
77 communes that changed the form of their legislative institution at least once between 1945
and 2010, most of them abolishing the assembly and introducing a parliament. We focus on such
switcher communes because communes that always had an assembly or a parliament are likely
di¤erent from each other in partly unobservable dimensions. We did our own data collection in
local archives of switcher communes in order to recover historical public expenditure information.
The second analysis exploits a cantonal law (in the canton Vaud) that prescribes a parliament
for communes with more than 800 inhabitants and lets voters choose their legislative power for
communes with up to 800 inhabitants. We identify the e¤ect of legislative organization on spending
using a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design that pools together administrative data from 5
legislative periods from 1986 to 2005.
Our event study analysis in the switcher sample suggests that adopting a parliament increases
total spending per capita by about 6 percent and that this increase is mostly driven by adminis-
trative and education spending. For other spending categories, such as welfare, law enforcement,
and tra¢ c and environment, we nd typically smaller and statistically insignicant e¤ects. The
causal interpretation of these estimates hinges on the assumption that time-varying unobservables
are uncorrelated with parliament adoption within communes over time. Although this assumption
is not directly testable, we show that results are robust to including time-varying controls for
population size and demographic composition. Introducing a commune-specic time trend leaves
our results una¤ected or increases the size of estimated impacts. Perhaps the most important val-
2Cantons represent the second and communes the third tier of government in the Swiss federal system.
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idation comes from the event study graph: pre-adoption e¤ects are small and insignicant while
the post-adoption period is marked by a sharp and persistent increase of e¤ect size estimates.
The positive impact of representative democracy on administrative spending is consistent with
rent-extraction (Persson and Tabellini 2000), but also with a mechanical increase due to newly
paid salaries for members of parliament and their sta¤. The positive impact on education spending
suggests that preferences for this type of spending are systematically under-represented in assembly
democracy, which is consistent with predicted low and potentially non-representative assembly
turnout due to participation costs (Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner 2000). Voting costs for Swiss
elections in contrast are particularly low because many cantons introduced postal voting over the
course of our study period (Funk 2010).
To better understand the socio-demographic characteristics of the median voter in assemblies
and elections, we also run an assembly surveyto investigate assembly participantsgender, age,
education, family status and working hours. Results suggest a sizeable under-representation of 20-
to 40-year-olds as well as of women in assemblies compared to both the electorate and to voters
in elections. Switching from assembly democracy to parliament thus increases the representation
of two demographics that are known for their relatively high preference for education spending.3
In contrast to the switcher sample estimates, regression discontinuity estimates of parliament
adoption on spending are generally negative. Results are quite imprecise, however, and we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that impacts of parliament adoption on spending are the same in the
RD and switcher samples or that the RD estimates are di¤erent from zero. The RD design seems
valid since there is no evidence of manipulation of the running variable (commune population) and
3See Figlio and Fletcher (2012) for a summary of the mostly U.S.-based literature on the share of elderly and
support for public education spending, and recent evidence by Bertocchi et al (2017). Cattaneo and Wolter (2009)
document with Swiss survey data that elderly people are less supportive of education spending. Carruthers and
Wanamaker (2015) summarize mostly U.S. evidence on womens greater preference for both private and public
goods and services that enhance child welfare. While less relevant for us, the link between gender and preferences
for education spending is less clear-cut in developing countries (see Chattopadhyay and Duo, 2004).
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no evidence of discontinuities in observable determinants of local spending choices, such as demo-
graphic structure, labor force participation or the share of foreigners in the commune. Moreover,
the rst stage is sizeable (about 35 percentage points) and highly signicant. We are also not
aware of other policies or regulations in the canton Vaud that are based on the same population
threshold, so the exclusion restriction likely holds in our setting.
Our paper most directly relates to Tyrefors-Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2014) who
compare welfare spending under assembly and representative democracy in early 20th century
Sweden after the introduction of universal and equal su¤rage using an RD design based on local
population. The main result is that parliaments spend 40 to 60 percent more on public welfare,
and the evidence points to elite capture in assemblies (where voting is typically non-anonymous
while voting in elections is anonymous) as the principal mechanism. While we do not nd any
e¤ects on welfare spending in either sample, this is not very surprising since elite capture is likely
a minor issue in Switzerland during our study period.
A concurrent paper by Sanz (2017) investigates the e¤ect of direct democracy on total spending
for very small communes in Spain. He employs an RD design (population threshold at 100 inhabi-
tants) and quite convincingly deals with the fact that the density of population size is discontinuous
at the cuto¤. His results suggest that representative democracy increases total spending by about
8 percent. Our paper goes further by decomposing the spending increase and by providing the
rst direct evidence of systematic demographic di¤erences between assembly participants, voters
and the electorate at large, which plausibly explain observed di¤erences in local public budget
choices.
Two other studies investigate the related question whether citizen assemblies lead to a di¤erent
resource allocation compared to referenda in developing country settings. Olken (2010) and Beath,
Christia and Enikolopov (2017) compare the types of projects chosen under citizen assemblies and
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secret ballot referenda, where villagers directly vote on projects. While referenda not only diminish
the inuence of elites on chosen projects (this result comes out more clearly in Beath et al.), they
also lead to signicantly higher citizen satisfaction. Again, a key di¤erence between these papers
and ours is the setting: Switzerland has been a mature democracy since long before 1945 and elite
capture is likely a minor issue in our setting.
Apart from the direct link to the before-mentioned literature on local direct democratic institu-
tions, our paper also relates to a recent strand of literature using credible identication strategies
to estimate the causal e¤ect of electoral institutions on a variety of policy outcomes (e.g. Miller
2008; Fujiwara 2015; Hainmüller and Hangartner 2015; León 2017). And nally, our paper adds
to a sizeable literature analyzing direct democratic elements (initiatives and referenda) within
representative governments (see Matsusaka, 2004, for an overview of the earlier literature).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents institutional background on the Swiss
federal system. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses identifying assumptions and the
estimation approach for our two research designs. Section 5 presents estimation results. Section 6
provides evidence on mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
2.1 Communal autonomy
Switzerland is a federal state with three layers of government: the federal level, the cantonal
level, and the communal level. Political responsibilities remain with the cantons unless they were
granted to the federal government in a national referendum. As a consequence, cantons have a lot
of autonomy in the provision of public goods and the choice of political institutions. The degree of
communal autonomy is regulated by canton laws, which leads to substantial heterogeneity across
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cantons. For instance, some cantons mandate political institutions at the commune level, while
other cantons let the communes choose freely.
For our switcher sample analysis we focus on the fourteen cantons that allow local choice of
the legislative institution (see online Appendix Table 1).4 We exclude communes from canton
Ticino, since most of the local institutional variation was generated by commune mergers. Other
cantons, such as Neuchâtel and Geneva, prescribe a parliament for all communes or mandate that
legislative decisions at the local level are made at the assembly or at the ballot box (cantons
Appenzell Innerrhoden, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Glarus, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri).
For our RD analysis we use communes from the canton Vaud, where the legislation prescribes
a parliament for communes with more than 800 inhabitants and allows local choice between par-
liament and assembly for communes with up to 800 inhabitants.5 Population thresholds also exist
for communes in cantons Fribourg, Vallis and Zürich, which are included in our switcher sam-
ple analysis, but the number of communes around these cuto¤s is small and the assignment rule
sometimes di¤ers, mandating an assembly below the cuto¤ and allowing choice above.
2.2 Commune responsibilities
In addition to the heterogeneity in communal autonomy across cantons, the distribution of respon-
sibilities for communal and cantonal public service provision also di¤ers across cantons. Typically,
however, commune responsibilities include preschool and primary education (grades 1 through 5
or 6), welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c, among others. For the medium-sized communes in
our switcher sample, responsibilities typically also include lower secondary education (grades 6
or 7 through 9). The bulk of communal spending is on education, welfare, tra¢ c and general
4In all but one canton (Scha¤hausen) there were actual switches of legislative institutions during our sample
period.
5In 2005 the cuto¤ was raised from 800 to 1,000 inhabitants.
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administration (Tables 1 and 2). As for total communal spending relative to cantonal and federal
spending, communes undertook 24% of total spending, the cantons 42%, and the federal level the
remaining 34% in the year 2010. A large share of local expenditures is nanced through a local
income tax.
2.3 Commune organization and political rights
Decision-making bodies at local level include the executive (usually called Gemeinderat), the leg-
islative, organized as either assembly or parliament, the electorate, and special committees for
example for nancial a¤airs. The exact division of powers in the budget process varies across
communes but typically it is characterized as follows. The executive implements approved expen-
ditures and drafts the budget proposal in consultation with the nance committee. The legislative
votes on the budget proposal and controls the execution of past expenditures. Participants at
assemblies can propose budgetary items for deliberation. Budgetary decisions are taken by simple
majority in an open vote, except if a secret vote is requested and approved. Under both legislative
forms, the nal say on the budget may rest with the electorate, either through mandatory or
facultative referendum - that is, when a su¢ cient number of citizens ask for a vote at the ballot
box.
3 Data
3.1 The switcher sample
To gather information on the institutional history of todays 2,551 Swiss communes, we sent an
e-mail with a link to an online survey to all municipal secretaries on April 27 2011. We asked for
information about the organization of the legislative since 1945, but also for other institutional
8
information (presence of initiative and referendum rights and corresponding changes since 1945).
After sending reminder e-mails and calling 1,120 communes, we obtained a survey response rate
(complete or partial) of 48.6% for our study cantons (see online Appendix Table 1).
Out of 881 communes that responded to our survey, there were 32 that had changed the form
of their legislative power between 1945 and 2010. For 25 switchers, we had all the necessary
information (year of the switch), because they had completed the relevant survey module. For 7
communes, we were missing the precise year of the switch. To gather this missing information,
we checked available local constitutions or called up the commune secretaries. For the 51.4% of
non-responders and another 129 respondents that only gave the current status of the legislative
power, we complement our analysis with previous surveys conducted by political scientists. In
four di¤erent waves (1988, 1994, 1998 and 2005) Professor Ladner and his team elicited detailed
information on the political structure (including legislative form) of local governments.
As can be seen in online Appendix Table 1, response rates in these Ladner surveys were
high. Most important for us is that for communes that lled out all the Ladner surveys, we can
reconstruct the entire institutional history between 1945 and 2005. The reason is that the surveys
did not only inquire about the current state of the legislative but also about past attempts to
change the form of the legislative power. As such, if a commune answered in the 1988 survey that
it had an assembly and no e¤ort had been undertaken to introduce a parliament in the past, we
can assume that they had an assembly all the way back to 1945. As a last source of information,
we used cantonal administrative information wherever available.6
Combining these three sources of information (our survey, the Ladner surveys, and cantonal
information on parliaments for four cantons) we identied 77 communes that had changed the
6For the canton Freiburg, we know the communities with a parliament today (15), and also the year it was
introduced. For the cantons Aargau, Valais and Zürich, we got a list of all communities that have or ever had a
parliament. Since we did not know the year in which the parliament was introduced (and/or potentially abolished),
we checked the websites for these communes or called them up to get this missing information.
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form of their legislative power, mostly abandoning the citizen assembly in favor of introducing a
parliament. As can be seen from Figure 1, the switcher sample is spread out all over Switzerland.
Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity in the time of institutional change across communes
(see online Appendix Figures 1 and 2).
What were the main reasons for the system change? Historically, the key argument in favor
of introducing a parliament was potentially better representation. Especially in large communes,
turnout in assemblies was very low (often less than 10 percent), which raised concerns about
representation. More recent attempts to introduce a parliament also mention low assembly turnout
as the main weakness of assembly democracy.7 As assembly turnout decreases with commune size
(Ladner 2016), a communes population size may be a key factor for the decision to adopt a
parliament. We control for population size in the switcher sample analysis. A frequent argument
against having a parliament was a potentially stronger inuence of political parties and lobbyists.
3.2 Local budgetary data for the switcher sample
Since standardized data in electronic format was only available for a subset of cantons and for more
recent years (starting in 1980 or 1990), most of the budgetary data had to be collected in the eld.
This required rst contacting each of the 77 sample communes (by phone and/or e-mail), to ask
for access to their local archives, and then to make all the necessary arrangements for the archive
visit. This process often involved several steps, and in some cases even involved formal requests
to the local executive body, as access to the archive was rst denied. Arrangements were made
with the head of the nancial department, the municipal clerk, or the municipal archivist. The
e¤orts required for reviewing the documents varied by commune and depending on canton-specic
transparency laws. In the end, we managed to get access to every single communal archive in our
7See e.g. Adligenswil will Gemeindeversammlung abscha¤en,Luzerner Zeitung, 27. Mai. 2015 or Die grösste
Gemeinde bleibt ohne Parlament,Basler Zeitung, 10. Juni 2015.
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switcher sample.
We collected data on total revenue and total expenditure, as well as expenditures broken down
by spending category. This so-called functional division classies expenditure items by the service
categories carried out by the commune. Harmonizing the categories for functional expenditure
over time and across communes was a major challenge. By 2010, the nancial accounting systems
of cantons and communes were largely standardized according to the Harmonized Accounting
Model (HAM-1) and applied all over Switzerland (most communes adopted the HAM-1 in the
1980s). In earlier years, however, accounting systems varied across cantons and time, and even
slightly within cantons. We coded every change in the communes accounting system and control
for these structural breaks using dummy variables in the regressions.
To be as consistent as possible, we proceeded as follows: (a) If the sub-division in the raw data
for earlier years was more detailed than under the later HAM-1, we aggregated the items into the
corresponding HAM-1-category, as close as possible in line with o¢ cial guidelines. (b) If the data
were more aggregated than the HAM-1 (e. g. "Education" and "Public Security and Health"
together), we adopted the coinciding category (Education), and set missing values for the non-
separable categories (Public Security; Health). (c) In the years prior to the HAM-1, it is generally
not possible to sharply disentangle the two HAM-1-categories "Tra¢ c" and "Environment and
Spatial Planning", but we can at least identify the items that would correspond to either of the
two under the HAM-1. We summarize all these items by the single meta-category "Tra¢ c and
Environment", which simply becomes the sum of the two HAM-1-categories from the 1980s.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for total revenue and spending per capita, as well as for the
most common spending categories, including administrative, education, welfare, law enforcement
and tra¢ c and environment spending. Together, these account for about two-thirds of total
spending. Other spending categories, such as health spending, were less common at the commune-
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level during our sample period.
3.3 The RD sample
For the sake of comparability, our RD analysis is based on a population range from 400 to 1,200
inhabitants, i.e. +/- 400 around the 800 cuto¤. Local population is based on administrative data
from the population o¢ ce of canton Vaud. The reference population for the 4-year legislative
period from year t to t+3 is population at the end of year t-2, with elections being held in the fall
of year t-1. We identied commune-years with reference population in the 400-1,200 interval for
the ve legislative periods 1986-1989, 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005. We exclude
more recent legislative periods because the cuto¤ for local legislative form choice was raised to
1,000 inhabitants in 2005. For communes in the 400-800 interval, we determined the status of the
legislative power using communal constitutions and minutes from actual assemblies and parliament
sessions. For those in the 801-1,200 interval we simply impute a parliament after doing some cross-
checks, again using local constitutions and session minutes. For communes from the canton Vaud,
local budgetary data are available from the statistical o¢ ce starting from 1985.
Table 2 show the budget categories we use in our RD-analysis. Education spending is most
important, followed by administrative spending and an aggregate category of welfare and health
spending. Note that the period of observation for the budgetary data from Vaud covers the 4-year
legislative cycle, while in the switcher sample the data are annual. Since we run all regressions in
logs, level di¤erences across the two samples are inconsequential for interpretation of the results.
Other budget categories, such as "Properties and Buildings" or "Construction", are only available
in either the switcher or the RD sample. There is no impact of parliament adoption on these other
categories. Results are available on request.
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3.4 Political participation survey
One key di¤erence between assembly and representative democracy is the level of political partic-
ipation or turnout. Indeed, our leading hypothesis is that turnout increases when parliamentary
elections are introduced, which in turn may alter the median voters preferences. Ideally, we would
therefore like to provide direct evidence on political participation from our switcher sample at dif-
ferent points in time. Unfortunately however, there are no historical data on turnout in assemblies
or in local legislative elections. We draw instead on a recent country-wide survey of municipal
clerks (Ladner survey 2009) that inquired about patterns of participation in assemblies and local
executive elections. While turnout is only available for local executive - not legislative - elections,
we veried for recent elections in our switcher sample that local executive and legislative turnout
are highly correlated (results available on request). We therefore think it is reasonable to assume
that similar participation patterns also characterized earlier periods.
3.5 Assembly survey
In order to understand whether assembly participants di¤er from voters in elections and from the
electorate at large, we conducted our own survey in canton Zürich communes during the fall of
2016. Out of the 154 communes in canton Zürich with a citizen assembly, 62 agreed to participate in
the survey. We decided to gather assembly participantscharacteristics at the budgetassembly,
which is when the upcoming years budget is decided.
At the start of the assembly, the municipal clerk explained to participants that the survey was
part of a study nanced by the Swiss national science foundation investigating the functioning
of citizen assemblies. The municipal clerk also encouraged assembly participants to ll out the
survey, explaining that anonymity was guaranteed and that the survey would take less than ve
minutes to ll out. The survey itself consisted of two pages and asked about gender, age, family
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status, education and labor market status. The municipal clerk counted the total number of
assembly participants so that we could assess the response rate, which was 66 percent on average.
As a robustness check we also looked only at communes with response rates larger than 70 percent
and found quantitatively similar results (available on request).
3.6 Electorate characteristics
From the statistical o¢ ce of canton Zürich we obtained information on the set of individuals
eligible to vote (Swiss citizens, aged 18 years and above). Data on age are administrative and
cover the entire population of the canton, while data on education, family structure and hours
worked are collected as part of an annual survey (Strukturerhebung) run jointly by the federal
government and cantonal authorities.8 We aggregate each variable across all individuals living in
the 62 communes that participated in our assembly survey.
3.7 Voter characteristics
Local parliament elections take place every four years and voting is either done by mail or at the
ballot box. Because there are no commune-level surveys of voter characteristics, we rely on post-
national-election surveys (Swiss Electoral Studies) that are representative at the cantonal, not
local level. Respondents were contacted in the weeks following an election and asked information
on gender, age, education, income, and civil status.9 We combine the 2011 and 2015 survey rounds
to obtain a total sample size of 1,127 respondents who participated in the respective preceding
national elections.
One natural question is whether voters in national elections di¤er from voters in cantonal or
8See https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/bevoelkerung/erhebungen/se.html for further infor-
mation.
9A description of the surveys and all the data can be found here: http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/selects/.
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local elections. To address this concern, we exploit an earlier post-national-election survey from
2007 that asked about participation in both federal and cantonal elections. Comparing the charac-
teristics of voters in federal and cantonal elections, we nd that they are almost identical (results
available upon request). Moreover, an even earlier survey from 2003 asked about respondents
interest in local and cantonal politics on a scale from one to four. Among voters in cantonal
elections, average interest in local politics was 2.88, while for cantonal politics it was 2.86. It
therefore seems reasonable to expect socio-demographic characteristics of voters in cantonal and
local elections to be similar.
3.8 Control variables
Control variables (commune population, demographic structure, labor force participation rate,
and share foreigners) are from the Swiss Federal Statistical O¢ ce (Bundesamt für Statistik). We
interpolate control variables between census years, except for commune population which is based
on yearly administrative data for the canton Vaud and for the switcher sample between 1981 and
2010. As can be seen from the summary statistics in Tables 1 and 2, the communes of canton
VD are comparable to the communes in the switcher sample in terms of age structure, labor force
participation or the share of foreigners. However, the communes in the RD sample are much
smaller compared to the communes in the switcher sample (a mean of 688 inhabitants versus a
mean of 8,532 inhabitants).
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4 Identication and estimation approach
4.1 Switcher sample analysis
Let Yct denote spending per capita in a given category or overall in commune c and period t, Dct
the indicator for parliament (1) or assembly (0),  the (constant) e¤ect of parliament relative to
assembly, Xct commune population, demographic controls (share of population in age brackets
20-39, 40-64, 65 and above), labor force participation rate and share foreigners, c commune
xed-e¤ects, t time xed-e¤ects, and Uct the inuence of unobserved additional factors that
a¤ect outcomes. The baseline specication is as follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct + Xct + c + t + Uct: (1)
The causal interpretation of xed-e¤ects estimates hinges on the assumption that time-varying
unobservables are uncorrelated with parliament adoption, conditional on the commune- and time
xed-e¤ects and time-varying controls. We control for population to address the concern that the
likelihood of parliament adoption increases with population size. We also control for commune
demographics since the age prole of the population is a potential determinant of public spending
priorities, as are labor force participation and the share foreigners in the commune. Our second
specication additionally controls for commune-specic linear trends ct. The third specication
in addition controls for commune-specic breaks in the local accounting system.
We also conduct an event study analysis in order to assess the validity of the research design.
Let Ec denote the year commune c switched for the rst time from assembly to parliament between
1945 and 2010. As shown in online Appendix Figures 1 and 2, all communes except for two started
out with an assembly and switched to parliament at least once during this period. 12 communes
switched back to assembly after a few years. Dene time from parliament adoption in commune
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c as Kct = t Ec, and let Dkct = IfKct = kg denote a dummy variable equal to 1 for the kth year
from parliament adoption and zero otherwise. We look at 8 years prior and 8 years post-adoption
so k runs from -8 to 8 and we include a dummy for 9 or more years prior to adoption and another
dummy for 9 or more years post-adoption. Focusing on a 16-year window around adoption ensures
that the coe¢ cients are identied from a similar set of communes. Expanding the pre- or post-
adoption periods would lead to shifting sample compositions as some communes transitioned to
parliament less than 8 years into the sample period while others transitioned too late. Moreover,
12 communes switched back to the assembly form after a few years under parliament as shown
in online Appendix Figures 1 and 2. The omitted base category is the year prior to parliament
adoption so that coe¢ cients on the time from adoption dummies reect di¤erences compared to
the year prior to adoption. Our main event study specication also includes time-varying controls,
commune-specic trends, and structural break dummies as above. Results without these controls
are quantitatively similar but less precise as shown in our online Appendix. The event study model
is then as follows:
ln(Yct) =
X
k
kD
k
ct + Xct + c + t + ct+ Uct; (2)
Dkct =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
IfKct  kg k   9
IfKct = kg  8  k  8
IfKct  kg k  9
: (3)
Intuitively, introducing a parliament in the future should probably not a¤ect spending today
and thus large and signicant pre-adoption e¤ects might signal that parliament adoption is en-
dogenous. On the other hand, we would expect the impact of parliament on spending to occur
fairly rapidly after adoption and for the e¤ect to be persistent.
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4.2 RD design
The basic intuition behind the regression discontinuity design is that communes just to the left of
the 800 population cuto¤ should provide valid counterfactual outcomes for communes just to the
right of the cuto¤ where parliament is mandatory. More formally, let Zct = I[popct > 800] denote
the indicator for being above the population cuto¤, popct commune population, f(popct   800)
and g(popct   800) linear or quadratic splines in normalized population, and Vct the inuence of
unobserved additional factors that a¤ect parliament adoption, in addition to Z. The model is as
follows:
ln(Yct) = Dct + f(popct   800) + Uct; (4)
Dct = Zct + g(popct   800) + Vct: (5)
If E[U jpop] and E[V jpop] are continuous, the exclusion restriction holds, and if there is a rst
stage ( > 0), then the ratio of the reduced-form coe¢ cient divided by the rst stage coe¢ cient
 identies :10 Throughout the paper, we focus on reduced form estimates in order to maintain
a close correspondence with the graphical evidence.
Intuitively, the continuity assumption requires that unobservables vary smoothly as a function
of commune population and, in particular, do not jump at the cuto¤. As shown in Lee and Lemieux
(2010), su¢ cient for the continuity assumption is the assumption that individual densities of the
treatment-determining variable are smooth. In our case, this assumption explicitly allows for
communes to have some control over their particular number of inhabitants. As long as this
control is imprecise, treatment assignment is essentially randomized around the cuto¤. Precise
10With heterogeneous treatment e¤ects and imperfect compliance, the ratio of RD-gaps identies a local average
treatment e¤ect "close" to the cuto¤. This result requires the monotonicity assumption which in our case says that
communes that adopted a parliament with population below the cuto¤ would have also adopted parliament had
their population been above the cuto¤. This seems uncontroversial.
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control over resident population is unlikely because local population is recorded by cantonal and
not communal authorities. We are also not aware of other policies or regulations in the canton
Vaud that are based on the 800 population threshold, so the exclusion restriction likely holds in
this setting.
5 Estimation results
5.1 Switcher sample results
Table 3 shows estimation results of equation (1) for total spending and spending categories in the
switcher sample. Each panel shows three impact estimates, corresponding to specications with
time and commune xed e¤ects and time-varying controls, additional commune-specic linear
trends, and additional dummies for structural breaks in the local accounting system.11 Results
in panel A show that having a parliament increases total spending per capita by about 7 percent
compared to an assembly. This e¤ect is marginally signicant at 10 percent even with commune-
specic linear trends and marginally insignicant when controlling for accounting system changes.
Total revenue also increases by about 7 percent (results available on request). Unfortunately
we did not collect data on revenue composition and thus are unable to pinpoint which revenue
categories increased.
Turning to the decomposition of the spending increase, panels B and C of Table 3 show
that the parliament system increases administrative spending and education spending per capita
by about 12 percent in the most demanding specication with commune-specic time trends
and structural break dummies. Impact estimates for welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c and
environment spending shown in panels D through F respectively are small and statistically not
11Results without time-varying controls are quantitatively similar and are available on request.
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signicant. Similarly, estimates for other spending are also generally small and not signicant
(results available on request).
Figure 2 plots event study impact estimates on spending per capita from 8 years prior to
adoption until 8 years post-adoption based on equation (2). Panels A through C display impacts
on total, administrative and education spending per capita, respectively. The three panels show
a pattern of pre-adoption e¤ects that bounce around zero, followed by a sharp and persistent
increase of the e¤ect estimate at the time of parliament adoption. For total spending, the post-
adoption estimates average about 6 percent and they are not signicantly di¤erent from zero due
to the disaggregation. For administrative and education spending, the post-adoption estimates
average about 13 and 15 percent respectively, and most estimates are statistically di¤erent from
zero.
In contrast, event study estimates for welfare, law enforcement, and tra¢ c and environment
spending exhibit no clear pattern around the time of parliament adoption and are statistically not
signicant almost without exception as shown in panels D through F. For example, while e¤ect
estimates for welfare spending in the post-adoption period average about 10 percent, similary-sized
"impacts" are already present several years prior to adoption as shown in panel D of Figure 2.
Event study estimates for other spending categories also look similar and are available on request.
Figure 3 in the online Appendix shows the same pattern of results from an event study speci-
cation that only controls for commune and time xed e¤ects. Overall, the econometric evidence
for the switcher sample suggests that adopting a parliament increases total spending per capita by
about 6 percent and that this increase is mostly driven by administrative and education spending.
Indeed, since administrative spending accounts for about 10 percent of the budget, while education
accounts for about 20 percent as shown in Table 1, together these categories account for a total
spending increase of about 0:1 0:13 + 0:2 0:15 = 4:3 percent.
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5.2 RD sample results
We now turn to the regression discontinuity analysis of parliament adoption on budget allocation
in canton Vaud. Before comparing spending of communes around the 800 population cuto¤, we
visually check whether there is sorting around the threshold. Figure 3 conrms that there is no
bunching on either side of the threshold and the McCrary density test gives a log di¤erence in
height at the cuto¤ of -.035 with standard error 0.276. In addition, Table 4 shows that observables
appear continuous at the 800 population cuto¤. Overall, these results are consistent with the
smooth density assumption required for identication.
We proceed with estimating the rst stage coe¢ cient  in equation (5). As shown in Table
5 rst row (and depicted in Figure 4), the probability of having a parliament jumps by about 35
percentage points for communes with 801 compared to those with 800 inhabitants. Comparing
now di¤erent types of spending at the cuto¤, Table 5 shows that the reduced form estimates are
mostly negative are insignicant throughout with only one exception (see also Figures 5 and 6
for administrative and education spending, respectively). Implied instrumental variable estimates
of parliament adoption can be obtained by multiplying the reduced form estimates by three.
Results using optimal bandwidths as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) as well as
bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014) are similar and available on request.
We conclude that we cannot say much about the e¤ect of representative (versus assembly)
democracy in small communes in our setting since the standard errors are too large to rule out
sizeable e¤ects in either direction. Moreover, we also cannot reject that the e¤ects for administra-
tive and education spending are the same across the RD and switcher samples. We nonetheless
believe it is important to report even noisy results for the sake of transparency.
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6 Mechanisms
What are likely mechanisms driving the results in the switcher sample, starting with the positive
e¤ect on education spending? Our leading hypothesis is that turnout increases when parliamentary
elections are introduced and that this induces a shift towards a pivotal voter with higher preferences
for education spending. Figure 7 supports the rst step in this causal chain, documenting that
turnout in communal executive elections is indeed an order of magnitude higher than participation
in assemblies for a large sample of communes from all over Switzerland.
Moving to our assembly survey results from canton Zürich, Panel A of Figure 8 provides ev-
idence that assembly participants are signicantly older than the electorate in communes that
participated in our assembly survey. As is evident from that gure, 20- to 40-year-olds are par-
ticularly under-represented in those communes. While the average Swiss citizen is 50.9 years old,
average age of assembly participants is 57.1. Panel B of Figure 8 shows that 20- to 40-year-olds
are under-represented in assemblies also compared to canton Zürich voters who participated in
national elections (the average voter is 52.8 years old).
In addition, Panel A of Figure 9 shows that women are under-represented in assemblies com-
pared to their proportion in the electorate in the set of communes that participated in our assembly
survey. While the proportion of females among Swiss citizens is about 0.51, the proportion of fe-
male assembly participants is only 0.40. Similarly, Panel B of Figure 9 shows that women are
also under-represented in assemblies when compared to canton Zürich voters in national elections
in which about 48 percent are female. Results for other characteristics are less clear-cut. For
example, Figure 4 in the online Appendix shows that the average level of education is similar
among assembly participants and canton Zürich voters in national elections.
A natural concern is whether these results generalize beyond canton Zürich. We again take
advantage of the 2009 survey of municipal clerks, who were asked about their subjective opinion
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regarding which groups of people are over- or under-represented at assemblies in their commune.
Reassuringly, we nd that municipal clerks tend to view young people and women as being under-
represented at assemblies, while highly-educated people seem to be proportionally represented
(results available on request). Together, these results suggest that switching from assembly democ-
racy to parliament tends to increase the representation of women and middle-aged citizens, two
demographics that are known for their relatively high preference for education spending (Figlio
and Fletcher 2012, Cattaneo and Wolter 2009, Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015, Bertocchi et al.
2017).
7 Conclusion
This paper empirically investigates whether the choice of legislative institution matters for the
level and composition of local government spending in Switzerland. While the results are too
noisy to be informative for small communes, we nd that for medium-sized communes introducing
a parliament increases total spending per capita by about 6 percent. The spending increase is
mostly driven by general administration and education spending. While rent seeking and the cost
of running a parliament can explain the increase in administrative spending, they are unlikely to
account for the increase in education spending. A more likely mechanism is a change in the identity
and preferences of the pivotal voter. Legislative elections (compared to assemblies) increase the
representation of middle-aged citizens and women, two groups that tend to be relatively favorable
to public spending on education. Overall, these results suggest that the form of the local legislative
institution matters for budget allocation and that the benets of direct citizen participation may
come at the cost of selective representation. Future research might therefore investigate ways to
give under-represented groups more voice in the assembly decision-making process.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the switcher sample
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Form of the local legislative power (authors' data collection)
Parliament (1), Assembly (0) 5,082 0.506 0.500 0 1
Local budgetary data (authors' data collection)
Total revenue per capita 4,762 3,702 2,562 134 30,273
Total spending per capita 4,790 3,659 2,520 164 30,273
Administrative spending per capita 4,797 370 287 16 2,620
Welfare spending per capita 4,285 437 495 0 3,543
Law enforcement spending per capita 4,329 149 126 0 1,234
Education spending per capita 4,502 755 507 3 2,848
Health spending per capita 3,400 150 151 0 1,056
Traffic and environment spending per capita 4,680 632 650 0 7,587
Control variables (Bundesamt für Statistik)
Resident population 5,082 8,532 6,052 404 29,006
Labor force participation rate  (%) 5,082 61.8 4.6 46.5 79.1
Share of 0- to 19-year-olds (%) 5,082 28.8 6.1 14.9 45.7
Share of 20- to 39-year-olds (%) 5,082 30.5 4.2 13.9 53.0
Share of 40- to 64-year-olds (%) 5,082 28.9 3.9 16.9 45.5
Share of at least 65-year-olds (%) 5,082 11.8 4.4 2.7 30.0
Share foreigners (%) 5,082 15.4 9.5 0 53.8
Notes: The unit of observation is a commune-year. The sample period ranges from 1945 to 2010. Budgetary
data are in year 2010 Swiss Francs based on the consumer price index. Control variables are from the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für Statistik). Resident population is based on administrative data from 1981
to 2010 and interpolated from census data between 1945 and 1980. The other control variables are interpolated
based on census data.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the RD sample
Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Form of the local legislative power (authors' data collection)
Parliament (1), Assembly (0) 531 0.555 0.497 0 1
Local budgetary data (Statistique VD)
Total revenue per capita 531 19,189 5,669 8,472 69,736
Total spending per capita 531 19,196 5,613 8,556 69,626
Administrative spending per capita 531 2,378 938 695 7,678
Welfare and health spending per capita 531 1,760 1,618 223 8,203
Law enforcement spending per capita 531 491 286 134 2,894
Education spending per capita 531 3,728 1,369 872 15,405
Traffic and environment spending per capita 531 1,014 644 0,069 4,133
Control variables (Bundesamt für Statistik and Statistique VD)
Reference population 531 688.6 216.6 401 1,197
Labor force participation rate  (%) 531 64.3 6.9 36.6 99.0
Share of 0- to 19-year-olds (%) 531 26.4 3.9 16.3 41.0
Share of 20- to 39-year-olds (%) 531 28.3 4.6 15.7 51.4
Share of 40- to 64-year-olds (%) 531 33.0 4.5 16.4 52.2
Share of at least 65-year-olds (%) 531 13.1 4.5 2.9 30.0
Share foreigners (%) 531 13.7 7.5 2.1 41.2
Notes:  The unit of observation is a commune in a 4-year legislative period. The sample period ranges from 1986
to 2005. Commune-legislative periods are included in the sample if the reference population falls within the interval
(400, 1200). Reference population refers to the year preceding the legislative period. Budgetary data are in year
2010 Swiss Francs based on the consumer price index. Reference population is based on administrative records
from the Statistical Office of canton Vaud (Statistique VD). The other control variables are interpolated based on
census data from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (Bundesamt für Statistik).
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Figure 8: Age of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich communes that took part in our 2016 assembly
survey. Assembly participants responded to our survey. The electorate corresponds to Swiss
citizens and is based on register data collected by the statistical office of canton Zürich.
Panel A: Assembly vs. Electorate
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich. Assembly participants are from those communes
that took part in our 2016 assembly survey. Voters in national elections participated in the Swiss
Electoral Studies surveys of 2011 or 2015 and are from the entire canton.
Panel B: Assembly vs. Voters in Elections
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Figure 9: Gender of assembly participants, the electorate and voters
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich communes that took part in our 2016 assembly
survey. Assembly participants responded to our survey. The electorate corresponds to Swiss
citizens and is based on register data collected by the statistical office of canton Zürich.
Panel A: Assembly vs. Electorate
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Notes: All respondents are from canton Zürich. Assembly participants are from those communes
that took part in our 2016 assembly survey. Voters in national elections participated in the Swiss
Electoral Studies surveys of 2011 or 2015 and are from the entire canton.
Panel B: Assembly vs. Voters in Elections
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